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I. Introduction 
After years of modest growth, drug spending has increased 
dramatically. Spending in 2014 grew by over thirteen percent, the largest 
annual increase since 2001.1 On average, the prices of traditional brand 
drugs grew by five to seven percent,2 but prices on several high-profile 
drugs have increased by as much as 3000 percent.3 Even some generic 
medications—the traditionally cheaper alternative to brand drugs—have 
 
†  Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. 
1. IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, MEDICINE USE AND SPENDING SHIFTS: A REVIEW OF THE 
USE OF MEDICINES IN THE U.S. IN 2014 5 (2015).  
2. Id. at 7. 
3. Aimee Picchi, Martin Shkreli-style Drug Price Hikes are Everywhere, CBS 
MONEYWATCH (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/martin-shkreli-style-
drug-price-hikes-are-everywhere/. 
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experienced significant price increases.4 This surge in drug spending has 
been driven by the increasing popularity of expensive specialty drugs such 
as biologics, higher prices on brand drugs, and fewer patent expirations that 
open the door for cheaper generics. 5 
In response to the sharp increase in spending and skyrocketing prices, 
consumers, insurance plans, medical groups, and politicians are looking for 
explanations and demanding change.6 Reforms to curb further increases 
have engendered rare cross-party alliances in Congress and even rarer 
agreement among presidential candidates.7 Proposed reforms include 
allowing more government intervention in the Medicare Part D drug 
program,8 imposing direct price controls on drugs for lower-income 
Medicare patients,9 capping consumers’ out-of-pocket costs for drugs,10 
promoting generic competition,11 and enhancing sanctions for 
anticompetitive practices.12 
 
4. See, e.g., Peter Jaret, Prices Spike for Some Generic Drugs, AARP BULLETIN (July, Aug. 
2015), http://www.aarp.org/health/drugs-supplements/info-2015/prices-spike-
for-generic-drugs.html; Trefis Team, Why are Generic Drug Prices Shooting Up?, 
FORBES (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2015/02/27/why-are-generic-
drug-prices-shooting-up/#25bc238a377e. 
5. IMS INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 5-8. 
6. See, e.g., Richard Mark Kirkner, Drug Pricing Regulation Pushed from Many Sides, 
MANAGED CARE (Jan. 2016), 
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2016/1/drug-pricing-regulation-
pushed-many-sides; Jeanne Whalen, Doctors Object to High Cancer-Drug Prices, 
WALL ST. J. (Jul. 23, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/doctors-object-to-high-
cancer-drug-prices-1437624060. 
7. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Drug Prices Soar, Prompting Calls for Justification, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/business/drug-
companies-pushed-from-far-and-wide-to-explain-high-prices.html; Thomas 
Sullivan, Both Houses of Congress Investigating Prescription Drug Prices, POL’Y & 
MED. (Nov. 06, 2015), http://www.policymed.com/2015/11/both-houses-of-
congress-investigating-prescription-drug-prices.html. 
8. Sy Mukherjee, Trump Joins Clinton, Sanders & Obama in Endorsing Medicare Drug 
Price Negotiations, BIOPHARMADIVE (Jan. 27, 2016), 
http://www.biopharmadive.com/news/trump-joins-clinton-sanders-obama-in-
endorsing-medicare-drug-price-nego/412840/. 
9. Hillary Clinton’s Plan for Lowering Prescription Drug Costs, HILLARY FOR AM., 
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets/2015/09/21/hillary-clinton-
plan-for-lowering-prescription-drug-costs/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
10. Anne Gearan & Amy Goldstein, Clinton Proposing $250 Monthly Cap on 
Prescription Drug Costs for Patients, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/09/22/clinton-
proposing-250-monthly-cap-on-prescription-drug-costs-for-patients/. 
11. Allison Gilchrist, Senate Scrutinizes Generic Drug Approval Backlog, PHARMACY TIMES 
(Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/senate-scrutinizes-
generic-drug-approval-backlog. 
12. See, e.g., Kirkner, supra note 6. 
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In this article, I explain why reforms promoting competition will 
produce better results and fewer negative consequences than reforms 
imposing new price controls. Price controls are government-mandated 
limits on prices or government-required discounts on prices. Basic 
economic principles, past experience, and empirical data indicate that new 
price controls will likely increase drug prices for some consumers, slow 
pharmaceutical innovation, curtail generic competition, and reduce patient 
access to certain medications. In contrast, reforms aimed at promoting 
competition or prohibiting anticompetitive practices will expand product 
offerings, lower drug prices for more patients, and incentivize innovation. 
The article proceeds as follows: in Section II, I outline several demand-
side and supply-side developments that have significantly impacted the 
pharmaceutical industry in recent decades. The nature of competition 
between brand drug companies and generic companies has changed 
dramatically as generics have increased their market share from nineteen 
percent to over eighty-eight percent of drugs sold in the United States. 
Brand companies now realize few sales after their patents expire and 
generics enter the market. At the same time that brand companies have 
lost market share and profits to generics, they have also seen increased 
power from pharmaceutical buyers—namely drug plans and pharmacy-
benefit managers (“PBMs”). PBMs and drug plans now largely determine 
what consumers pay for drugs, what pharmacies they use, and what drugs 
they take, which has diminished drug companies’ influence over prices. 
Drug companies have also experienced significant increases in both the 
costs of drug development leading to approval by the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) and the risks of product failures. The costs to bring 
a drug to market have increased from less than $200 million to over two 
billion dollars,13 and only one in ten drugs that begin clinical trials is 
eventually approved by the FDA.14 As the development costs for traditional 
drugs have increased, drug manufacturers have shifted much of their 
research and development efforts toward biologic products.15 Although 
these complex drugs did not enter the market until the 1980s, they now 
comprise over a quarter of all drug spending in the United States.16 
Unfortunately, because of their high costs of development and production 
 
13. See HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & RONALD W. HANSEN., BRIEFING: COST OF DEVELOPING A NEW 
DRUG (2014). 
14. Michael Hay et al., Clinical Development Success Rates for Investigational Drugs, 
31 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 40, 44 (2014). 
15. See generally Shannon Gibson et al., Why the Shift? Taking a Closer Look at the 
Growing Interest in Niche Markets and Personalized Medicine, 7 WORLD MED. 
HEALTH POL’Y 3, 3 (2015). 
16. Andrew Pollack, Biotech Firms, Billions at Risk, Lobby States to Limit Generics, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/battle-in-
states-on-generic-copies-of-biotech-drugs.html?_r=0. 
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and lack of competitors to control prices, biologic drugs are prohibitively 
expensive for many consumers.17 
In Section III, I describe existing government programs that impose 
price controls in the pharmaceutical industry and explain the likely 
consequences of further controls. As of 2005, over twenty percent of drugs 
sold in the U.S. were sold under government programs that mandate price 
controls, such as Medicaid, the 340B Program, the Department of Defense 
and Veterans Affairs programs, and spending in the coverage gap of 
Medicare Part D.18 Some programs even require drugs to be sold for a 
penny.19 Further price controls will create incentives for manufacturers to 
charge higher prices to non-covered patients to offset the discounted 
prices. If manufacturers are not able to offset discounts by increasing prices 
for non-covered consumers, all consumers may ultimately suffer. Empirical 
data suggest that price controls contribute to drug shortages, slow 
innovation, and curtail generic competition.20 Ultimately, price controls 
meant to lower drug spending for some consumers could end up harming 
all consumers. 
Rather than restraining prices through price controls, the government 
should promote competition to reduce drug prices. In Section IV, I discuss 
the many actions the government could take to increase competition in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Reducing the generic-approval backlog at the FDA 
will increase generic competition for drugs, expediting affordable biosimilar 
alternatives to biologics will lower prices for many specialty medications, 
and targeting anticompetitive behavior will promote competition 
throughout the industry. By increasing competition, these actions will 
expand product offerings to consumers, lower prices as suppliers compete 
to attain or protect valuable market share from rivals, and foster innovation 
as drug companies strive to create new products to stay ahead of 
competitors. 
The recent surge in drug spending must be addressed to ensure that 
patients can continue to afford life-saving and life-enhancing medications. 
 
17. Anthony D. So & Samuel L. Katz, Biologics Boondoggle, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/opinion/08so.html (explaining “biologic 
medicines, which cost, on average, 22 times as much as ordinary drugs.”). 
18. See Jordan Rau, Medicare reveals how much it spends on prescription drugs for 
Americans, PBS NEWSHOUR (May 1, 2015, 8:32 AM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/medicare-reveals-much-spends-
prescription-drugs-americans/. 
19. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERV., CLARIFICATION OF PENNY PRICING POLICY (2011), available at 
https://www.hrsa.gov/opa/programrequirements/policyreleases/pennypricingcl
arification112111.pdf. 
20. Patricia Earl & Phillip L. Zweig, Connecting the Dots: How Anticompetitive 
Contracting Practices, Kickbacks, and Self-dealing by Hospital Group Purchasing 
Organizations (GPOs) Caused the U.S. Drug Shortage, CARE & COST (2012), 
https://careandcost.com/2012/02/14/connecting-the-dots-how-
anticompetitive-contracting-practices-kickbacks-and-self-dealing-by-hospital-
group-purchasing-organizations-gpos-caused-the-u-s-drug-shortage/. 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
The Prescription for Rising Drug Prices: Competition or Price Controls? 
319 
However, imposing new price controls on pharmaceuticals will produce 
negative consequences—less innovation, drug shortages, fewer product 
choices, and higher prices for some consumers—that could harm 
consumers rather than helping them. In contrast, promoting competition 
will lower pharmaceutical prices and drug spending without these 
deleterious effects. 
II. Recent Developments in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
The pharmaceutical industry has steadily expanded over the last 
several decades. Global revenue for the industry was approximately one 
trillion dollars in 2015, compared to approximately $340 billion in 1989.21 
The United States alone spent over $400 billion on pharmaceuticals in 
2015.22 
During this period of expansion, the pharmaceutical industry has 
undergone significant changes that have altered the nature of competition 
in the industry, shifted the relative bargaining power of drug sellers and 
drug buyers, and increased the costs of developing and selling drugs. In this 
section, I outline several demand-side and supply-side developments that 
have significantly impacted the pharmaceutical industry in recent decades. 
A. Demand-Side Developments: Generic Competition and Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers 
The nature of competition in the pharmaceutical industry has changed 
dramatically over the past several decades as brand companies have lost 
significant market share to generics. The generic industry exploded after 
the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 created an abbreviated regulatory process 
that encouraged companies to produce and market cheaper, generic 
drugs.23 First, to spur the introduction of low-cost generics, Hatch-Waxman 
created the Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) process that 
allows a generic that demonstrates bioequivalence to rely on previously 
submitted brand-name safety and efficacy data.24 This greatly truncated 
process enables generic manufacturers to quickly enter the market after 
 
21. THOMSON REUTERS, Global Pharma Sales to Reach $1.3 Trillion (Aug. 4, 2015), 
http://thomsonreuters.com/en/articles/2015/global-pharma-sales-reach-above-
1-trillion.html; Vivian Hunt et al., A Wake-up Call for Big Pharma, MCKINSEY & CO. 
(Dec. 2011), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/health_systems_and_services/a_wake-
up_call_for_big_pharma. 
22. IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, GLOBAL MEDICINES USE IN 2020: OUTLOOK AND 
IMPLICATIONS 35 (2015), available at http://www.imshealth.com/en/thought-
leadership/ims-institute/reports/global-medicines-use-in-2020. 
23. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED 
COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY, ix (1998). 
24. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2016). 
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the brand drug’s patent expires. Moreover, Hatch-Waxman actively 
incentivizes generic companies to challenge brand patents’ validity by 
creating a pathway for such challenges and by offering a lucrative incentive 
to the first generic manufacturer that files an ANDA claiming that the brand 
patent is either invalid or will not be infringed by the new generic. If the 
generic company wins or settles the patent litigation, it receives a 180-day 
exclusivity period during which the FDA will not approve any other generic 
versions of the drug, a period in which the first generic can earn substantial 
profits by shadow pricing the innovator’s price.25 
Generics have been further aided by drug substitution laws in every 
state that allow, or even require, pharmacists to automatically substitute a 
generic equivalent drug when a patient presents a prescription for a brand 
drug.26 These regulatory changes have allowed generics to capture 
significant market share from brand companies.27 As shown in Figure 1, 
whereas generics comprised only nineteen percent of all drugs dispensed 
prior to 1984, they now represent over eighty-eight percent of prescriptions 
filled. 
Figure 1. Growth in Generics’ Share of Pharmaceutical Market28 
 
 
25. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY GENERIC 
DRUG EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, & 
COSMETIC ACT (1998).  
26. BUREAU CONSUMER PROT., DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION: STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMM’N at 48, 150, 153 (1979). 
27. U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 23, at ix. 
28. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-371R, DRUG PRICING: RESEARCH ON SAVINGS 
FROM GENERIC DRUG USE 2 (2012); IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, DECLINING 
MEDICINE USE AND COSTS: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? A REVIEW OF THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE 
UNITED STATES IN 2012, at 15 (2013), available at 
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The increased competition from generics puts downward pressure on 
prices, generating significant cost savings for consumers. After the patent 
expiry of a brand drug, generics enter the market at a significantly lower 
price. Data show that generics enter the market at a price fifty percent less 
than their brand counterpart.29 As more generics enter the market, the 
price eventually drops to eighty percent off the pre-expiry brand prices.30 
This lower price directly reduces spending for consumers. Indeed, the surge 
of cheaper generic products in recent years has produced significant savings 
for consumers; in the last decade alone, generic drugs have saved the 
healthcare system over one trillion dollars.31 
Moreover, the speed at which customers switch from brand drugs to 
their generic counterparts is significantly faster than it was several decades 
ago. As shown in Figure 2, upon market entry, generics routinely capture 
over seventy percent of the brand drug’s market within only three months. 
In contrast, as recently as 1999, generics captured less than forty percent 
of the market within three months. Within twelve months, generics now 
capture over eighty percent of the brand drug’s market share, whereas in 
1999, they captured slightly over fifty percent. 
 
 
http://static.correofarmaceutico.com/docs/2013/05/20/usareport.pdf; PHRMA, 
CHARTPACK: BIOPHARMACEUTICALS IN PERSPECTIVE 56 (2016), available at 
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/chartpack-2015.pdf. 
29. IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, PRICE DECLINES AFTER BRANDED MEDICINES LOSE 
EXCLUSIVITY IN THE U.S 3 (2016). 
30. Id. 
31. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 4. 
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Figure 2. Generic Erosion of Brand Drug Market Share32 
As a result of this swift erosion of their market share, brand 
pharmaceutical firms realize few sales after they reach the patent cliff and 
generics enter the market.33 An early study by the U.S. Congressional 
Budget Office found that during the first decade after the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, total net revenues generated by new drugs declined by twelve percent 
as a result of generic entry.34 Between 2012 and 2018, it is estimated that 
pharmaceutical companies will lose almost $150 billion in revenues 
because of patent expirations.35 
However, generic erosion of brand profits and the accompanying price 
reductions are somewhat cyclical because they depend on patent 
expirations. The first generic entrants in a market earn substantial profits 
as consumers immediately switch from brand drugs to the generic 
competitor. However, as more generics enter a market, the market share 
and profits of any individual generic manufacturer decline. Thus, patent 
expirations and the promise of significant profits for the first generic 
competitors incentivize generic entry. Conversely, fewer patent expirations 
result in less generic entry and, in turn, less price reduction. For example, 
reduced brand innovation in the mid-1990s resulted in fewer patent 
 
32. Henry Grabowski et al., Recent Trends in Brand Name and Generic Drug 
Competition, 17 J. MED ECON. 207, 207 (2013). 
33. VanEck, Drug Patent Expirations: $190 Billion in Sales Up for Grabs, MARKET REALIST 
(Mar. 3, 2016, 1:58PM), http://marketrealist.com/2016/03/drug-patent-
expirations-190-billion-sales-grabs/. 
34. U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 23, at 38. 
35. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, FROM VISION TO DECISION: PHARMA 2020, at 6 (2012), 
available at http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/pharma-life-
sciences/pharma2020/assets/pwc-pharma-success-strategies.pdf. 
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expirations of brand drugs between 2013 and 2015,36 and in turn, less 
generic entry. 37 
At the same time that brand companies have lost market share to 
generics, they have also faced increased power from pharmaceutical 
buyers. PBMs, which administer the prescription drug coverage for over 
ninety-five percent of insured Americans,38 have adopted various benefit 
changes and tools to reduce pharmaceutical prices and steer patients to 
less-expensive alternatives.39 For example, PBMs have successfully reduced 
drug spending by requiring substitution of generic drugs for brand name 
drugs when clinically appropriate. 40 Many PBMs also offer mail-order 
pharmacy services that lower drug prices by ensuring that consumers are 
dispensed the cheapest drug within a therapeutic class, which is often a 
generic. 41 
PBMs also employ tiered formularies—a list of approved or preferred 
drugs for the health plan—and direct consumers to the formulary drugs 
with incentives, such as lower copayments. Because formulary status can 
greatly influence the sales of a drug, PBMs are able to negotiate significant 
discounts from drug manufacturers in exchange for a formulary listing.42 
Once on the formulary, drugs are assigned to one of several tiers based on 
their cost to the health plan.43 For example, whereas a non-formulary drug 
may cost a beneficiary one hundred dollars, drugs in the generic tier of the 
formulary could cost ten dollars and drugs in the brand tier of the formulary 
could cost thirty dollars. The tiered copayments and coinsurance give 
beneficiaries a powerful incentive to use generic or low-cost brand-name 
medications. 
 
36. See IMS INST., supra note 28, at 16. 
37. Katie Thomas, Generic Drug Makers See a Drought Ahead, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/business/generic-drug-makers-
facing-squeeze-on-revenue.html?_r=0. 
38. Federal Trade Commission, Letter to Senator Richard L. Brown, North Dakota 
Senate, 4 (March 8, 2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050311northdakotacomnts.pdf. 
39. See Dan Goldman et al., Prescription Drug Cost Sharing: Associations With 
Medication and Medical Utilization and Spending and Health, 298 J. AM. MED. 61, 
61 (2007). 
40. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EFFECTS OF USING PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS ON 
HEALTH PLANS, ENROLLEES, AND PHARMACIES 28 (2003). 
41. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS: OWNERSHIP OF MAIL-ORDER 
PHARMACIES 23-40 (2005). 
42. Federal Trade Commission, Letter to Assembly Member Greg Aghazarian, 
California General Assembly, 6-7 (September 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/V040027.pdf. 
43. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 41, at 6-7. 
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These and other innovative tools have saved Americans billions of 
dollars each year.44 However, they have also dramatically changed the 
landscape of the pharmaceutical market by lessening drug companies’ 
influence over prices. In the 1970s, most prescription drugs were prescribed 
by doctors that were largely insensitive to price, methodically filled by 
pharmacists, and paid for by consumers or, less frequently, by third-party 
payors that had little influence over the drug chosen or the price paid.45 As 
a consequence, drug manufacturers had enormous control over price. In 
contrast, the market for prescription drugs in 2016 is one in which the PBMs 
and drug plans have harnessed the buying clout of millions of consumers to 
negotiate discounted prescription drug prices.46 PBMs and drug plans now 
largely determine what consumers pay for drugs, which pharmacies they 
use, and which drugs they take.47 As a result, PBMs and drug plans have 
replaced drug manufacturers in the driver’s seat when it comes to 
determining prices. 
B. Supply-Side Developments: Increasing Costs and Biologic Drugs 
At the same time that generics and PBMs have decreased the demand 
for brand drugs, drug companies have also experienced significant 
increases in the costs of drug development leading to FDA approval and the 
risks of product failures. Since the 1962 amendments to the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), the FDA has continued to increase the 
requirements for new-drug approvals. For example, whereas clinical trials 
in the 1970s typically only enrolled 2000 patients, trials in the 1990s 
regularly enrolled over 5000 patients.48 Similarly, the costs of recruiting 
patients, the length of the clinical-trial period, and the number and 
complexity of clinical tests used in clinical trials have increased over time.49 
These more-stringent requirements, along with the more-complex science 
associated with specialized medications, have significantly increased the 
 
44. U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ISSUES IN DESIGNING A PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT FOR MEDICARE 
40 (2002) (Estimating of the magnitude of PBMs’ cost-savings range from 30 
percent to 35 percent of total prescription drug spending); Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers (PBMs): Generating Savings for Plan Sponsors and Consumers, VISANTE 
5 (2011), http://thatswhatpbmsdo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/visante-
pbm-savings-study-Feb-2016.pdf. 
45. See Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The 
Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1011, 1077-1120 
(2010). 
46. Thomas Gryta, What is a ‘Pharmacy Benefit Manager?’, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903554904576460322664055
328.html. 
47. Id. 
48. Henry Grabowski, The Evolution of the Pharmaceutical Industry Over the 
Past 50 Years: A Personal Reflection, 18 INT. J. ECON. BUS. 161, 169 (2011). 
49. Id.; Kenneth A. Getz et al., Variability in Protocol Design Complexity by Phase and 
Therapeutic Area, 45 DRUG INFORM. J. 413 (2011). 
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costs of drug development and FDA approval. The most current estimates 
indicate that it now costs approximately $2.6 billion to develop and bring 
each new drug to market.50 However, as shown in Figure 3, those costs were 
estimated to be $179 million in the 1970s;51 $413 million in the 1980s,52 and 
$1.04 billion in the 1990s and early 2000s.53 In contrast, it costs generic 
manufacturers only one to two million dollars to bring a drug to market.54 
Figure 3. The Cost of Bringing a New Drug to Market 
Moreover, only about ten percent of brand drugs that begin clinical 
trials are eventually approved by the FDA. The most recent study to track 
FDA approval rates found that the approval rate varied by trial phase: phase 
I had a 64.5 percent success rate, phase II had a 32.4 percent success rate, 
phase III had a 60.1 percent success rate, and the FDA approved 83.2 
percent of applications that passed phase III.55 Ultimately, of one hundred 
 
50. GRABOWSKI & HANSEN, supra note 13. 
51. Ronald W. Hansen, The Pharmaceutical Development Process: Estimates of 
Current Development Costs and Times and the Effects of Regulatory Changes, in 
ISSUES IN PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS, 151 (R. I. Chien, ed., 1979). 
52. GRABOWSKI & HANSEN, supra note 13 (as shown in graph titled “Growth in 
Capitalized R&D Costs per Approved New Compound”). 
53. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug 
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 181 (2003). 
54. See Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Public Limited Company, 2012 WL 7649225 (2012) No. 12-
3824. 
55. Hay et al., supra note 14, at 41 (Stating phase I trials—usually including 20-80 
healthy subjects and lasting 1-3 months—focus on the safety of the drug and 
determine the metabolic and pharmacologic actions of drugs, side effects of 
increasing doses, and early evidence of effectiveness. Phase II trials—usually 
including 100-300 subjects and lasting 1-2 years—focus on the drug’s 
effectiveness. Phase III verifies the drug’s efficacy and safety with 1,000-3,000 
subjects suffering from the disease and lasts 1-4 years). The study used data from 
2003-2011 and included both new drug applications and biologic license 
applications. Id. at 40. 
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drugs that begin Phase I trials, only ten drugs will eventually be approved.56 
As a result, drug-approval rates have increased little in recent decades, 
despite dramatic increases in research and development (“R&D”) spending. 
Figure 4 illustrates these disparate trends. 
Figure 4: New Drug Approvals and R&D Spending57 
Even after FDA approval, pharmaceutical manufacturers increasingly 
face patent challenges that reduce the likelihood that drugs will achieve 
commercial success. Hatch-Waxman actively incentivizes generic 
companies to challenge the validity of brand-name patents by creating a 
pathway for such challenges and by offering a lucrative incentive to the first 
generic manufacturer that files a challenge—known as a Paragraph IV 
challenge—claiming that the brand patent is either invalid or will not be 
 
56. Id. at 41. 
57. Annual Membership Survey, PHRMA 4 (2015), 
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015-
phrma_profile_membership_results.pdf (showing industry R&D spending in 2014 
dollars and based on members of the PhRMA trade association); FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., Summary of NDA Approvals & Receipts, 1938 to the Present, FDA.GOV, 
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/productregulation/summaryof
ndaapprovalsreceipts1938tothepresent/default.htm (noting that drug approvals 
from 1980-2011 include new molecular entities, including both chemicals and 
biologics) (last updated Jan. 18, 2013); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CTR. DRUG EVAL. & 
RESEARCH, NOVEL DRUGS 2015 3 (2016) (noting that data from 2012-2014 is from the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration). 
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infringed by the new generic.58 If the generic company wins or settles the 
patent litigation, it receives a 180-day exclusivity period during which the 
FDA will not approve any other generic versions of the drug, a period in 
which the first generic can earn substantial profits.59 As a result of these 
incentives, Paragraph IV challenges have exploded in recent years; whereas 
only nine percent of drugs facing generic entry in 1995 were challenged, 
eighty-one percent of drugs facing generic entry in 2012 were challenged.60 
Moreover, Paragraph IV challenges are occurring earlier in the life of brand 
drugs. Drugs entering the market as generics in 1995 faced their first 
challenge 18.7 years after original launch.61 By comparison, drugs entering 
the market as generics in 2012 saw only 6.9 years between market launch 
and the first Paragraph IV challenge.62 These challenges threaten a drug’s 
commercial success and cost pharmaceutical companies significant legal 
fees. 
Moreover, in 2012 the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act gave generics 
a new administrative venue to challenge patents, the inter partes review 
(“IPR”).63 IPR challenges replaced inter partes re-examinations to facilitate 
patent challenges by offering a quicker, more-efficient, and less-expensive 
procedure.64 Indeed, data show that generics and other parties are taking 
advantage of the new pathway; the number of IPR challenges to 
pharmaceutical patents continues to increase, with twice as many 
challenges filed in 2015 compared to 2014.65 
The competition from generics, increasing power of PBMs, increasing 
R&D costs, and risk of patent challenges mean that many pharmaceuticals 
will never attain commercial success. Even for the ten percent of drugs that 
receive FDA approval, only twenty percent will ever earn enough revenue 
 
58. Margo Bagley, Patent Term Restoration and Non-Patent Exclusivity in the U.S., in 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PATENT LAW 111, 116-117 (Josef Drexel 
& Nari Lee eds., 2013). 
59. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 25, at 4. 
60. Grabowski et al., supra note 32, at 106. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat at 299–305 (2011) 
(setting forth procedures for IPR). 
64. See Joanna Shepherd, Disrupting the Balance: The Conflict between Hatch-
Waxman and Inter Partes Review, N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENTM’T L. (forthcoming 
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2838236 (giving a 
full explanation of IPR and the administrative proceedings it replaced). 
65. See Stephen Maebius, Bio/Pharma IPR Challenges Nearly Double in 2015, PTAB 
TRIAL INSIGHTS (July 28, 2015), 
https://www.ptabtrialinsights.com/2015/07/biopharma-ipr-challenges-nearly-
double-in-2015-cabilly-415-patent-challenged/. 
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to cover the growing R&D costs.66 Moreover, the likelihood that a drug will 
become profitable has decreased over time as the risk of failure and 
development costs have increased.67 The average lifetime revenues for new 
drugs are lower now than at any point in the last twenty-five years.68 
As the development costs for traditional drugs have increased, drug 
manufacturers have shifted much of their research and development 
efforts toward biologic products. Biologics primarily distinguish themselves 
from traditional drugs by their origins: they derive from living organisms, 
typically proteins, though occasionally including toxins, blood, viruses, or 
allergens.69 These medications are far more complex than traditional 
medicines. Whereas a traditional drug might contain between a few dozen 
to one hundred atoms per molecule, a biologic’s complicated proteins can 
include from several thousand to tens of thousands of atoms per 
molecule.70 
Biologics are comparatively new, relative to traditional drugs; the FDA 
cleared the first biologic for human use, human insulin, in 1982.71 However, 
by 2013, spending on biologic drugs comprised a quarter of all drug 
spending in the U.S.72 This spending is expected to grow at an annual rate 
of over ten percent, eventually reaching over $386 billion in 2019.73 
Biologic drugs are currently prohibitively expensive for many 
consumers. The average cost of a biologic drug is twenty-two times greater 
than a traditional drug.74 The average annual cost of a biologic drug is 
estimated to be $34,550,75 but annual costs for many biologic drugs exceed 
 
66. John A. Vernon et al., Drug Development Costs When Financial Risk is Measured 
Using the Fama-French Three-Factor Model, 19 HEALTH ECON. 1002, 1004 (2010). 
67. Ernst Berndt et al., Decline in Economic Returns from New Drugs Raises Questions 
about Sustaining Innovations, 34 HEALTH AFFAIRS 245, 251-2 (2015). 
68. See generally PhRMA, supra note 57, at 3. 
69. Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding & Incentivizing Biosimilars, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 57, 59 (2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(I) (2006)). 
70. See, e.g., Joan Kerber-Walker, Small Molecules, Large Biologics, and the Biosimilar 
Debate, ARIZ. BIOINDUSTRY ASS’N. (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.azbio.org/small-
molecules-large-biologics-and-the-biosimilar-debate. 
71. See JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FDA REGULATION OF FOLLOW-ON 
BIOLOGICS 1 (2010) [hereinafter CRS FDA REPORT]. 
72. Andrew Pollack, Biotech Firms, Billions at Risk, Lobby States to Limit Generics, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/battle-in-
states-on-generic-copies-of-biotech-drugs.html; see also IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE 
INFORMATICS, MEDICINE USE AND SHIFTING COSTS OF HEALTHCARE: A REVIEW OF THE USE OF 
MEDICINES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2013, at 30 (2014). 
73. BCC RESEARCH, REPORT OVERVIEW: BIOLOGIC THERAPEUTIC DRUGS: TECHNOLOGIES AND GLOBAL 
MARKETS, No. BIO079C (2015). 
74. So & Katz, supra note 17. 
75. Erwin A. Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr, Jr., Innovation and Competition: Will 
Biosimilars Succeed? 9 BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE 24, 26 (2012). 
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$200,000.76 Moreover, by requiring large patient coinsurance for specialty 
drugs, such as biologics, most consumers’ prescription-drug insurance 
coverage fails to fully defray these massive costs.77 As a result, many 
consumers cannot afford to obtain these life-saving or life-enhancing drugs. 
Fortunately, Congress has recognized the need for cheaper, biosimilar 
versions of biologic drugs. Similar to generic versions of traditional drugs, 
biosimilars are close substitutes for brand biologic drugs that can be sold at 
a lower price after the brand biologic’s patent expires.78 As part of the 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Congress created a biosimilar-approval 
pathway that would enable these cheaper biologic drugs to obtain FDA 
approval and reach patients more quickly.79 Consumers stand to benefit 
significantly from the new market competition from lower-cost, but 
similarly effective, biosimilars; in fact, estimates suggest this competition 
could save consumers $250 billion over the next decade.80 
However, the FDA has, thus far, been slow to approve biosimilars, 
approving only three biosimilar drugs to date.81 Furthermore, the FDA has 
yet to issue guidance on how biosimilars should prove they are 
interchangeable with biologics.82 Burdensome requirements for 
interchangeability will increase the difficulty and cost of biosimilar 
 
76. Francis Megerlin et al., Biosimilars and The European Experience: Implications For 
The United States, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1803 (2013). 
77. See, e.g., Leigh Purvis, Senior Strategic Policy Advisor, AARP, Presentation for FTC 
Biosimilars Workshop on Naming Proposals and Impact on Competition at 8-12 
(Feb. 4, 2014), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/Follow-
On%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legislative%
20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Competition/purvis.pd
f. 
78. HRI’s Top Ten Health Industry Issues of 2016, Issue 9: Biosimilars, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (2016), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/health-
industries/top-health-industry-issues/biosimilars.html. 
79. Id. 
80. See, e.g., Steve Miller, Senior Vice President, Express Scripts, Presentation for FTC 
Biosimilars Workshop on Naming Proposals and Impact on Competition, at 7 (Feb. 
4, 2014), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/Follow-
On%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legislative%
20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Competition/miller.pd
f. 
81. See Zachary Brennan, FDA Approves Third Biosimilar in US, First for Amgen’s 
Blockbuster Enbrel, REGULATORY AFF. PROF’L SOC’Y (Aug. 30, 2016), 
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2016/08/30/25739/FDA-
Approves-Third-Biosimilar-in-US-First-for-Amgens-Blockbuster-Enbrel/. 
82. Zachary Brennan, FDA Likely to Require Substantial Clinical Data for 
Interchangeable Biosimilars, Lawyers Say, REGULATORY AFFAIRS PROF’L SOC’Y (Jan. 12, 
2016), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2016/01/12/23887/FDA-
Likely-to-Require-Substantial-Clinical-Data-for-Interchangeable-Biosimilars-
Lawyers-Say/. 
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approval, restricting the savings possible from biosimilar competition. 
Moreover, even when the FDA approves a biosimilar, there may be 
protracted patent challenges that significantly delay its availability to 
patients.83 
C. Changes in the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Organizational Structure 
With the intensifying competition from generics, expanding power 
from PBMs, increasing costs of R&D, and growing risk of commercial failure, 
the pharmaceutical industry has undergone significant structural change. 
Several large pharmaceutical companies have merged to offset losses in 
market share and achieve cost savings from greater economies of scale.84 
Indeed, the number of pharmaceutical companies earning more than five 
billion dollars in annual profits has shrunk in the last two decades.85 This 
consolidation has achieved some efficiencies and increased short-term 
earnings.86 
Similarly, the generic industry has experienced recent consolidation in 
response to the reduction in patent expirations and exclusivity periods. 
Many generic companies have merged, while others have acquired brand 
companies to diversify their risk and reliance on generic drugs.87 
But at the same time the pharmaceutical industry has experienced 
greater horizontal consolidation, it has also seen more vertical 
disintegration. Until the mid-1970s, the industry was dominated by large 
firms that generally kept most divisions in house; from R&D, production, 
and regulatory affairs to marketing, they were fully vertically integrated.88 
Moreover, the firms generally financed their own R&D expenditures, using 
primarily internal finance and, sometimes, bank loans.89 However, in the 
1980s, the importance of biotechnology startups and development-stage 
firms with venture-capital financing expanded.90 These firms positioned 
themselves as a specialized layer between academic-research institutions 
 
83. See Peter Loftus, Panel Recommends FDA Approval of Remicade Knockoff, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/panel-recommends-fda-
approval-of-remicade-knockoff-1455057993. 
84. Grabowski, supra note 48, at 173. 
85. Hunt et al., supra note 21. 
86. Grabowski, supra note 48, at 173. 
87. Cynthia Koons, Teva’s Just the Start as More Generic Drugmakers Poised to Merge, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-
05/teva-s-just-the-start-as-more-generic-drugmakers-poised-to-merge. 
88. Grabowski, supra note 48, at 162. 
89. See id. at 170. 
90. Iain M. Cockburn, The Changing Structure Of The Pharmaceutical Industry, 23 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 10, 15-16 (2004). 
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and pharmaceutical companies, and slowly evolved into important 
suppliers of cutting-edge technology to pharmaceutical companies.91 
Now, instead of developing new products in their own R&D facilities, 
large pharmaceutical firms increasingly seek alliances with biotechnology 
and development-stage firms for new technologies and a broader R&D 
pipeline.92 The advantages of these smaller firms—proximity to academic 
research, a less bureaucratic structure, and a higher tolerance for risk—
gives them a comparative advantage in drug research.93 In contrast, the 
large pharmaceutical firms specialize in large-scale clinical trial design, 
manufacturing, marketing, and coordination with regulatory authorities.94 
Pharmaceutical companies increasingly rely on the research conducted by 
biotechnology companies, with as much of forty percent of pharmaceutical 
sales now coming from drugs that originated in biotechnology companies.95 
This outsourcing of drug development to biotechnology companies over the 
last several decades has contributed to biotechnology’s significantly higher 
growth rates compared to traditional pharmaceutical companies.96 
III. Price Controls in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Politicians have recently called for price controls on pharmaceutical 
prices. Price controls are government-mandated limits on prices or 
government-required discounts on prices.97 Hillary Clinton has called for 
price controls for lower-income Medicare patients98 and President Trump 
joined Clinton, Bernie Sanders, and President Obama in calling for more 
government intervention in the Medicare Part D program.99 This section will 
describe existing government programs that utilize price controls in the 
pharmaceutical industry and explain the likely consequences of further 
controls. 
A. Existing Price Controls 
In this section, I discuss the largest public drug programs that utilize 
price controls—Medicaid, the 340B program, Department of Defense 
(“DOD”) and Veterans Affairs (“VA”) programs, and spending in the 
 
91. Id. at 16. 
92. Grabowski, supra note 48, at 165-66. 
93. Id. at 165. 
94. Id. 
95. Cockburn, supra note 90, at 16. 
96. Hunt et al., supra note 21. 
97. See Price Controls, LIBRARY ECON. & LIBERTY, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/College/pricecontrols.html (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2017). 
98. See, e.g., HILLARY FOR AM., supra note 9. 
99. Mukherjee, supra note 8. 
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coverage gap of Medicare Part D. These public programs accounted for over 
forty percent of the drug spending in non-hospital settings in 2014.100 As a 
result of their wide coverage, manufacturers have little choice but to 
participate in the public programs. Moreover, it is difficult for 
manufacturers to pick and choose among programs; the Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) requires participants in Medicaid to 
also make drugs available under the 340B, DOD, and VA programs. 101 
In order to sell drugs to consumers covered by these public programs, 
manufacturers must agree to offer certain rebates or discounts on drug 
prices. The calculations are generally based on the average manufacturer 
price (“AMP”)—the average price wholesalers pay manufacturers for drugs 
that are sold to retail pharmacies—or the best price (“BP”)—the lowest 
price at which the manufacturer offers the drug to any purchaser, including 
all rebates and discounts. 
1. Medicaid 
Created in 1965, the Medicaid program provides health insurance for 
low- income and medically needy individuals.102 The specific methodology 
used to determine the required rebate depends upon whether the drug is 
a brand drug, generic drug, a clotting-factor drug, or an exclusively pediatric 
drug.103 For example, for brand-name drugs, the required rebate is the 
greater of 23.1 percent of the AMP or the difference between the AMP and 
the BP.104 That is, brand manufacturers are required to sell drugs for 23.1 
percent off the AMP, or, if they offer the drug for an even lower price to 
any other purchaser, they must match that price for Medicaid. The effect of 
this best price requirement is to penalize manufacturers who discount their 
products in private negotiations. 
The Affordable Care Act significantly expanded Medicaid eligibility.105 
Whereas 34.2 million people were covered by Medicaid in 1995, by 2014, 
 
100. See, e.g., U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Nat’l Health Expenditures Data, 
CMS.GOV, at Table 4 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html. 
101. See U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID DRUG REBATE PROGRAM (2015) 
[hereinafter DRUG REBATE PROGRAM], available at 
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-
topics/benefits/prescription-drugs/medicaid-drug-rebate-program.html. 
102. See generally, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Medicaid Eligibility, 
MEDICAID.GOV (last updated Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-
chip-program-information/by-topics/benefits/prescription-drugs/medicaid-drug-
rebate-program.html. 
103. See DRUG REBATE PROGRAM, supra note 102. 
104. Id. 
105. See Obamacare Medicaid Expansion, OBAMACARE FACTS, 
http://obamacarefacts.com/obamacares-medicaid-expansion (last visited Feb. 
14, 2016). 
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this number had grown to 64.9 million individuals, or twenty percent of the 
U.S. population.106 State Medicaid data indicates that manufacturers paid 
in excess of $16.7 billion in Medicaid rebates in 2012.107 
2. 340B Program 
The 340B program, created by Congress in 1992, requires drug 
manufacturers to provide outpatient drugs at significantly reduced prices 
to 340B-qualified buyers.108 Qualified buyers generally include public-
health clinics serving uninsured and low-income patients and 
disproportionate-share hospitals whose patient populations include a high 
proportion of low-income patients.109 However, since the 340B program’s 
inception, the eligibility requirements have greatly expanded.110 
Specifically, the ACA broadened the definition of eligible entities to include 
many additional types of hospitals.111 Moreover, mergers between 340B 
providers and non-340B providers have further expanded the list of 
qualified buyers.112 As a result, both the number of 340B-eligible hospitals 
and the money spent on 340B drugs tripled between 2005 and 2014.113 By 
2014, there were over 14,000 hospitals and affiliated sites in the 340B 
program, representing about one-third of all U.S. hospitals.114 
As previously discussed, drug manufacturers that participate in 
Medicaid must enter into an agreement to sell drugs at a discount under 
the 340B program.115 Like the Medicaid discount, the 340B discounted price 
 
106. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., 2014 CMS STATISTICS (2014), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-
and-Reports/CMS-Statistics-Reference-
Booklet/Downloads/CMS_Stats_2014_final.pdf. 
107. DANIEL R. LEVINSON, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OEI-03-13-00659, MEDICAID REBATES 
FOR BRAND-NAME DRUGS EXCEEDED PART D REBATES BY A SUBSTANTIAL MARGIN, at 6 (2015). 
108. Veteran’s Health Care Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-585, 106 Stat. § 602 (amended 
Public Health Servs. Act to include § 340B). 
109. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: OVERVIEW OF THE 340B 
DRUG PRICING PROGRAM, at vii (2015). 
110. John McManus, The 340B Program is in Dire Need of Reform, LIFE SCI. LEADER (Apr. 
26, 2013), http://www.lifescienceleader.com/docpreview/the-b-discount-
program-is-in-dire-need-of-reform-0001/d42503b6-2543-4dce-a789-
a1ac008dd9b6. 
111. Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §7101, 124 Stat. 259 (2010). 
112. Aaron Vandervelde, Director, Berkeley Research Group, Presentation: 340B 
Covered Entity Acquisitions of Physician-based Oncology Practices, at 3 (Apr. 22, 
2014), available at 
http://www.thinkbrg.com/media/publication/449_340B%20Physician-
based%20Oncology%20Practice%20Acquisitions.pdf. 
113. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 109, at 10-12. 
114. Id. at 4. 
115. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, MEDICAID.GOV 
(last updated Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-
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is set relative to the AMP, and must be at least a 23.1 percent discount.116 
However, the statutory formula calculates different discounts for different 
products and is estimated to produce discounts that average forty-five 
percent off the AMP.117 Moreover, the formulas can result in a negative 
340B selling price for a drug, in which case the Health Resources and 
Services Administration (“HRSA”) instructs manufacturers to set the drug 
price at a penny.118 
HRSA estimates that covered entities saved $3.8 billion on outpatient 
drugs through the program in fiscal year 2013.119 Unfortunately, many of 
these savings are not reaching low-income patients. The 340B statute does 
not require that providers only dispense 340B drugs to needy patients.120 
Instead, providers may purchase 340B drugs at a steep discount, sell them 
to non-qualified patients, and pocket the difference between the 340B 
discounted price and the reimbursement from the non-qualified patients’ 
private insurance companies.121 Indeed, a recent study by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office found that about half of the 340B 
entities in the study generated revenue from private insurer 
reimbursements that exceeded 340B prices.122 As an example, Duke 
University Hospital, a 340B hospital, generated $48.3 million in 2012 by 
selling 340B discounted drugs to its patients, two-thirds of whom are 
privately insured.123 
3. Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs Drug Programs 
The DOD and VA are also major purchasers of prescription drugs. In 
2012, the DOD and VA spent $11.8 billion to purchase drugs on behalf of 
 
information/by-topics/benefits/prescription-drugs/medicaid-drug-rebate-
program.html. 
116. David H. Howard et al., Pricing in the Market for Anticancer Drugs, 29 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 139, 156 (2015). 
117. McManus, supra note 110. 
118. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-836, DRUG PRICING: MANUFACTURER DISCOUNTS 
IN THE 340B PROGRAM OFFER BENEFITS, BUT FEDERAL OVERSIGHT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT, at 11 
n.31 (2011); Id. at 21 (Stating, “one manufacturer reported that after the price of 
an oral contraceptive dropped to a penny as a result of HRSA’s penny pricing 
policy, it received an order from a covered entity that exceeded the 
manufacturer’s current national supply by 50 percent.”). 
119. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 109, at vii. 
120. See Lauren Flynn Kelly, 340B Program Shirks Charitable Care, Undermines 
Formularies, Argue PBMs, AIS HEALTH (Apr. 4, 2014), 
https://aishealth.com/archive/ndbn040414-02. 
121. See id. 
122. GAO-11-836, supra note 119, at 13. 
123. McManus, supra note 111. 
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approximately 18.5 million active-duty and retired military personnel, their 
dependents, and eligible veterans.124 
In order to sell drugs through Medicaid, drug manufacturers must also 
provide drugs to four government agencies—the VA, DOD, Public Health 
Service, and Coast Guard—at statutorily-imposed discounts.125 Drug 
manufacturers must provide certain drugs to these agencies at the lesser of 
(1) a twenty-four percent discount off the AMP offered to non-federal 
sources or (2) the lowest price manufacturers charge their most-favored 
nonfederal customers under comparable terms.126 Both the DOD and the 
VA also use prescription drug formularies to lower prices even further 
below the statutorily-required discounts.127 Moreover, the agencies enter 
into national contracts to provide additional pricing concessions from 
specific vendors.128 The most recent estimate of the price savings from the 
combination of these efforts indicates that VA and DOD pricing for brand 
pharmaceuticals was approximately forty-one to forty-two percent of the 
average wholesale price (“AWP”).129 
4. Medicare Part D 
The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 added an optional Medicare 
prescription drug benefit, Medicare Part D, to offer coverage to many of the 
nation’s retirees and disabled persons.130 In 2015, more than thirty-nine 
million beneficiaries were enrolled in Medicare Part D plans.131 The Part D 
plans are actually private plans that receive payments from the government 
to provide Medicare-subsidized drug coverage for enrollees. 
Unlike Medicaid and the 340B program, there is no statutory rebate 
level on prescription drugs covered under the program. Instead, the private 
Medicare Part D plans, acting on behalf of the Medicare program, negotiate 
prices with pharmaceutical manufacturers and may obtain price 
 
124. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-358, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: COMPARISON OF 
DOD AND VA DIRECT PURCHASE PRICES 1 (Apr. 2013). 
125. Veterans Health Care Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-585, 106 Stat. 4971, §603(a)(1), 
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concessions in the form of rebates.132 Manufacturers are willing to offer 
significant rebates and discounts in order to provide drugs to the millions 
of covered participants. According to Medicare Trustees, a board that 
reports annually to Congress on the financial operations of Medicare, the 
rebates often amount to as much as a twenty- to thirty-percent discount on 
brand medicines.133 Manufacturers paid in excess of $10.3 billion in Part D 
rebates in 2012.134 
In addition to the significant discounts negotiated by the private plans, 
the Medicare Part D program does include direct price controls on drugs 
sold in the coverage gap. The coverage gap (or “donut hole”) is a spending 
level at which enrollees are responsible for a larger share of their total drug 
costs than they are at below or above this level. For 2016, the coverage gap 
begins when the individual and the plan have spent $3310 on covered drugs 
and ends when they have spent $7515.135 Medicare Part D requires brand 
drug manufacturers to offer fifty-percent discounts on drugs sold during the 
coverage gap.136 These discounts will cost drug manufacturers 
approximately forty-one billion dollars between 2012 and 2021.137 
5. State Price-Control Initiatives 
In addition to the federal regulations and programs discussed above, 
states are currently considering their own price controls. The California 
Drug Price Relief Act, which appeared on the state’s November 2016 ballot, 
would have prohibited state agencies from paying more for a drug than the 
price at which the drug is sold under the federal VA drug program.138 A 
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similar measure in Ohio, the Ohio Drug Price Relief Act,139 will appear on 
the November 2017 ballot.140 
B. Likely Consequences of Further Price Controls 
Although the existing price controls lower prices for some consumers, 
they likely result in increased prices for others. Many of the required 
rebates under Medicaid, the 340B program, and VA and DOD programs are 
based on drugs’ AMP. Calculating rebates from average drug prices gives 
manufacturers an incentive to set higher prices to wholesalers and 
pharmacies in order to offset discounts.141 Moreover, with at least forty 
percent of drugs sold under price controls, and some programs even 
requiring drugs to be sold for a penny,142 manufacturers are forced to sell 
many drugs at significant discounts. This creates incentives to charge higher 
prices to other, non-covered patients to offset the discounts. Indeed, 
numerous academic studies and government analyses have concluded that 
required discounts under Medicaid and Medicare have resulted in 
increased prices for other consumers as manufacturers offset the revenue 
lost under price controls.143 Further price controls will only amplify these 
incentives. 
If manufacturers are not able to offset discounts by increasing prices 
for non-covered consumers, all consumers may ultimately suffer. Basic 
economic principles predict that price controls result in drug shortages; at 
a below-market price, the demand for drugs exceeds the amount of drugs 
that manufacturers are willing to sell. Indeed, recent research suggests that 
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price controls in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry have created drug 
shortages.144 
In addition, price controls may prevent many companies from earning 
profits sufficient to offset their R&D costs or the risk of failure. This could 
slow innovation, negatively impacting long-term health outcomes. 
Moreover, if other countries’ experiences are any indication, lower profits 
will likely curtail generic competition.145 A less-competitive pharmaceutical 
industry will, in turn, reduce choices, innovation, and, ironically, increase 
drug spending. 
As previously discussed, brand companies incur an average of $2.6 
billion in costs to bring each drug to market with FDA approval.146 They must 
offset these significant costs before generic competition destroys brand 
profits; within three months of the first generic entry, generics have already 
captured over seventy percent of the brand drugs’ market, and within 
twelve months, brand companies retain less than twenty percent of their 
original market share.147 As a result, brand companies have a very limited 
window during which they can earn revenues sufficient to offset the 
significant costs of R&D, not to mention the production, operating, 
marketing, and distributional costs of selling a drug. In fact, research 
indicates that the average window of exclusivity during which companies 
can earn significant revenues is less than thirteen years.148 Selling drugs at 
too low a price during this window will result in significant losses for drug 
companies. 
Furthermore, brand companies must price a drug not only to recoup 
the drug’s own costs; they must also consider the costs of all the product 
failures in their pricing decisions. Only about ten percent of drugs that begin 
clinical trials are eventually approved by the FDA.149 Moreover, even the ten 
percent of drugs that receive FDA approval are not all commercial 
successes. Data indicate that only twenty percent of marketed brand drugs 
will ever earn enough sales to cover their development costs.150 The other 
eighty percent of approved drugs generate losses for drug makers. 
Thus, if only ten percent of drugs are approved and twenty percent of 
those are able to recoup costs, then only one in fifty drugs developed by 
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brand companies is a winner that earns positive profits. The price of these 
winners must not just recoup their own costs, they must also help recoup 
the costs of the forty-nine out of fifty drugs that never earn a profit. Failure 
to cover the losers’ costs will slow investment in R&D; drug companies will 
not spend millions and billions of dollars developing drugs if they cannot 
recoup the costs of that development. 
Less R&D spending will, in turn, result in less innovation throughout the 
industry. A substantial body of empirical literature establishes a direct 
relationship between pharmaceutical firms’ profitability, research and 
development efforts, and innovation. Numerous studies have found that 
policies that increase pharmaceutical profitability lead to increases in new 
clinical trials, new molecular entities, and new drug offerings.151 Other 
studies have found that policies that reduce expected profitability lead to 
decreases in R&D spending.152 Indeed, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
confirms a “close correlation between revenues, cash flow, and profit 
margins on the one hand and R&D expenditures on the other.”153 Thus, if 
price controls force brand companies to operate in a way that reduces 
profitability over the long term, the result will be less innovation in the 
pharmaceutical market. 
Consumers will suffer from reductions in innovation. Research shows 
that pharmaceutical innovation has produced significant health benefits to 
consumers. Empirical estimates of the benefits of pharmaceutical 
innovation indicate that each new drug brought to market saves 11,200 life-
years each year. 154 Another study finds that the health improvements from 
each new drug can eliminate nineteen billion dollars in lost wages by 
preventing lost work due to illness.155 Additionally, because new effective 
drugs reduce medical spending on doctor visits, hospitalizations, and other 
medical procedures, data show that for every incremental dollar spent on 
new drugs, total medical spending decreases by more than seven dollars.156 
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Brand companies, and the profit incentives that motivate them, are largely 
responsible for pharmaceutical innovation. Thus, actions that reduce brand 
innovation will have long-term negative effects on consumer health and 
healthcare spending. 
Finally, lower profitability will likely reduce competition in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Generic entry, like the market entry of suppliers 
in any industry, depends on potential profits. Indeed, several examples 
illustrate the relationship between profits and generic entry. First, the 
substantial profit potential under the Hatch-Waxman 180-day exclusivity 
period has led to a significant increase in generic challenges.157 Second, 
generics race to enter the market upon brand-patent expiry to claim a share 
of brand drugs’ market share and profits before the market is saturated 
with generic competitors.158 Conversely, in periods when few patents are 
expiring, the existing profits available in the market are much lower and 
fewer generics enter.159 Finally, foreign countries that utilize price controls 
to control drug prices have significantly less generic competition; without 
the profit potential, fewer generics enter the international markets.160 
Currently, the U.S. market has more generic competition than any 
other market, largely because of the significant profit potential for these 
firms.161 However, additional price controls will lead to reductions in 
generic entry. This reduction in generic competition will reduce consumers’ 
choices of drugs and increase drug prices. Although price controls will 
require set discounts from average prices, without generic competition, 
these average prices will be much higher than they would be with more 
competition. Similarly, intensely competitive markets spur innovation as 
firms innovate to gain market share and outdo competitors. If price controls 
lead to a less-competitive market, incentives to innovate will also decline. 
IV. Facilitating Competition in Pharmaceuticals 
Instead of imposing price controls, there are many actions the 
government could take to increase competition in the pharmaceutical 
industry. By increasing competition, these actions will expand product 
offerings, giving consumers more choice in the drugs they take. They will 
also lower prices as suppliers compete to attain or protect valuable market 
share from rivals. Finally, increased competition will lead to more 
innovation as drug companies strive to create new products to stay ahead 
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of competitors. Below, I discuss several actions the government could take 
relatively quickly to increase competition in the pharmaceutical industry. 
A. Reduce Generic Approval Backlog at the FDA 
The single most important factor in controlling drug spending in recent 
decades has been the dramatic increase in generic-drug usage. Generic 
drugs saved consumers $254 billion in 2014 and $1.68 trillion over the past 
decade.162 The degree to which generics reduce drug prices depends on the 
number of generic competitors in the market; the more competitors, the 
more prices face downward pressure. Unfortunately, a backlog of generic 
drug approvals at the FDA has restricted generic competition in many 
important market segments. 
In 2012, Congress enacted the Generic Drug User Fee Act to provide the 
FDA with funds from generic-drug makers to ensure a speedy FDA approval 
process for generic drugs.163 Despite this, in January 2016, there were over 
3500 generic applications pending approval.164 Moreover, according to the 
chairman of the Senate health committee, the approval process is taking 
longer for generic drugs; the median approval time was thirty months in 
2012, compared to forty-eight months in 2016. 165 
Both the backlog of generics awaiting approval and the lengthy 
approval times are hindering generic entry and restricting the price drops 
that typically occur with increased competition. The price drop after generic 
entry depends on the number of generics entering the market; more 
generics mean a more significant decline in prices. Indeed, estimates 
suggest that by the time there are six or more competitors for a generic 
drug, the generic price has dropped to about ten percent of the brand 
price.166 Yet many drugs have only a few generic competitors and, as a 
result, consumers do not enjoy the savings that would be possible with 
more generic entry.167 
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Congress is currently pressuring the FDA to reduce this backlog and 
promote generic entry.168 Enhanced efforts will facilitate generic 
competition and, in turn, reduce drug prices and lower consumers’ 
spending on medications. 
B. Expedite Biosimilars Approval 
Recognizing the expansion in biologic drugs and the growing 
importance of affordable biosimilar alternatives, Congress provided an 
expedited FDA approval pathway for biosimilars under the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”) of the ACA.169 Under BPCIA, a 
proposed biologic substitute does not have to demonstrate bioequivalence, 
but merely biosimilarity, to a reference product.170 A product approved as 
biosimilar may further be deemed interchangeable with another biologic if 
its manufacturer can demonstrate that switching between the reference 
biologic and the proposed substitute presents no additional risk in safety or 
efficacy for consumers.171 Importantly, under federal law, interchangeable 
products may be substituted for reference biologics without a prescribing 
doctor’s intervention.172 However, BPCIA vests with the FDA broad 
discretion in determining biosimilarity; the FDA may rely on various 
studies—or waive these requirements173—make rules,174 issue guidance, or 
even categorically ban biosimilar applications for classes of biologics.175 
Despite BPCIA’s charge to the FDA, the FDA has proven surprisingly 
tentative in promoting biosimilar approval. As of January 2016, it had 
approved only three biosimilars for use in the U.S. despite several pending 
biosimilar applications.176 The FDA has also yet to provide any meaningful 
guidance as to what standards the agency will employ in determining 
whether a biosimilar is interchangeable with a biologic.177 Burdensome 
requirements for interchangeability will increase the difficulty and cost of 
biosimilar approval. Moreover, many states require biosimilars to be 
deemed interchangeable before they can be automatically substituted for 
their biologic counterpart at pharmacies.178 A high hurdle for what 
constitutes interchangeability will limit automatic substitution of affordable 
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biosimilars and, in turn, greatly reduce the savings possible from biosimilar 
competition. 
American consumers stand to benefit significantly from BPCIA’s 
biosimilar-approval pathway. Consumers currently spend over sixty-six 
billion dollars a year on high-priced biologic drugs.179 In 2014, ten biologics 
with over three billion dollars in annual sales were on the list of the top-
twenty-five selling drugs, and seven of the top eight best-selling drugs were 
biologics.180 Many biologic drugs are currently prohibitively expensive for 
consumers. The average cost of a biologic drug is twenty-two times greater 
than a traditional drug.181 Moreover, by requiring large patient coinsurance 
for specialty drugs, such as biologics, most consumers’ prescription-drug 
insurance coverage fails to fully defray these massive costs.182 As a result, 
many consumers cannot afford to obtain these life-saving or life-enhancing 
drugs. 
Expediting the approval of biosimilars will increase competition in the 
market for biologic drugs, reducing prices and allowing more patients 
access to these treatments. Evidence from Europe reveals that biosimilars 
have stimulated market competition, reducing prices and saving consumers 
between fifteen billion dollars and forty-five billion dollars from 2007 to 
2020.183 Many expensive biologics stand to soon go off-patent in the U.S., 
opening the door for competition from cheaper biosimilars.184 As a result, 
estimates suggest that a biosimilar-approval pathway at the FDA will save 
U.S. consumers between forty-four billion dollars185 and $250 billion186 over 
the next decade. 
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C. Prohibit Anticompetitive Practices 
In addition to promoting more competition, courts and lawmakers can 
do more to prohibit anticompetitive behaviors. Like promoting generic and 
biosimilar entry, preventing anticompetitive practices will increase 
competition in the pharmaceutical industry and lower prices. Although an 
in-depth discussion of anticompetitive practices in the pharmaceutical 
industry is beyond the scope of this article, recent investigations and 
regulatory actions suggest that a few new practices may be low-hanging 
fruit that could be easily targeted. Below I provide a few examples. 
First, some product-switching cases may be targets for increased 
enforcement. These cases arise when brand companies decide to shift their 
marketing efforts away from drugs about to go off-patent and toward a new 
drug that can serve as a substitute for the expiring drug. Much of this 
behavior is the predictable business response to the incentives created by 
patent law and state substitution laws. As previously discussed, developing 
a drug and obtaining FDA approval costs an average of $2.6 billion and the 
patent period provides a very limited window during which companies can 
charge higher prices to recoup these exorbitant costs. As the patent period 
expires, brand companies typically lose eighty to ninety percent of their 
sales to generic versions of the drug under state substitution laws that allow 
or even require pharmacists to automatically substitute a generic 
equivalent drug when a patient presents a prescription for a brand drug.187 
Instead of continuing to market drugs after the patent period expires and 
handing over eighty to ninety percent of their sales to generic competitors, 
brand companies often decide to shift their marketing efforts to a new drug 
that can serve as a substitute for the drug about to go off-patent. 
As I have argued in prior work,188 many product-switching cases are not 
anticompetitive because it is within patent holders’ rights to stop marketing 
a drug during its patent period, and removing an obsolete product from 
market when there is a new and improved version is not consumer 
coercion. Furthermore, marketing a new product that is still under patent 
does not prevent consumers from switching to generic versions of the prior 
drug and does not bar generics from several existing cost-efficient means 
of distribution. However, certain product-switching behavior may give rise 
to valid anticompetitive claims. Sometimes, the shift in marketing effort 
from a drug facing patent expiry to a substitute is accompanied by other 
wrongful and fraudulent behavior intended to coerce consumers. Examples 
include cases where the manufacturers fabricate safety concerns or falsely 
disparage the original drug to drive consumers to the new substitute.189 
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Other examples include cases where the manufacturer’s new drug is 
nothing but a sham innovation that does not justify shifts in marketing 
effort or redirecting consumers.190 Enforcing actions against these and 
similar anticompetitive practices in product-switching cases will facilitate 
generic entry and, in turn, lower drug prices. 
Abuse of the FDA’s Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (“REMS”) 
program is another area in which enhanced enforcement could increase 
competition. The FDA introduced REMS in 2007 to augment the agency’s 
post-approval authority over drugs and ensure that a drug’s benefits exceed 
its risks.191 The FDA requires REMS for drugs that need additional 
communication with prescribers, pharmacists, or patients to manage any 
risks or safety concerns associated with a drug.192 For many drugs, REMS 
restrict distribution and prescribing practices and require additional 
recordkeeping by prescribers and pharmacists. Nearly forty percent of new 
drugs are subject to REMS restrictions.193 
Unfortunately, generic manufacturers now claim that some brand 
manufacturers are using REMS to thwart generic entry. They argue that 
brand companies point to REMS’ restrictive distribution requirements to 
deny generic manufacturers access to the product samples they need to 
receive FDA approval. For example, the now-notorious Martin Shkreli and 
Turing Pharmaceuticals allegedly restricted the distribution of 
pyrimethamine to a single source to make it more difficult for generic 
competitors to obtain samples needed for bioequivalence testing.194 
Both the Federal Trade Commission and Congress launched 
investigations into Turing for possible antitrust violations when the 
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restricted distribution of pyrimethamine was accompanied by a 5000 
percent price increase.195 
Courts have yet to rule on whether restrictive distribution under REMS 
can constitute anticompetitive conduct.196 However, Congress is currently 
considering proposals to prevent any abuses.197 While limiting distribution 
to ensure that risky products are sold and used safely is what the FDA 
intended with the REMS program, using the program to limit generic entry 
harms competition and increases prices for pharmaceuticals. Courts and 
lawmakers should be cautious in striking the right balance between 
ensuring drug safety on the one hand and facilitating competition on the 
other. 
V. Conclusion 
Recent surges in drug spending have provoked anger and prompted 
calls for reform. However, policy makers should understand the full 
consequences of intervention in the pharmaceutical industry before acting. 
Reforms calling for new price controls could impose harms on consumers 
that outweigh any benefits that they provide through lower prices. Basic 
economic principles, past experience, and empirical data indicate that new 
price controls will likely increase drug prices for some consumers, slow 
pharmaceutical innovation, curtail generic competition, and reduce 
consumer choice. In contrast, reforms aimed at promoting competition or 
prohibiting anticompetitive practices will lower pharmaceutical prices and 
drug spending without these deleterious effects. 
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